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ABSTRACT. The central terms of certain theories which were valued highly in the past, 
such as the phlogiston theory, are now believed by realists not to refer. Laudan and 
others have claimed that, in the light of the existence of such theories, scientific realism 
is untenable. This ]~aper argues in response that realism is consistent with - and indeed 
is able to explain - such theories' having been highly valued and yet not being close to 
the truth. It follows that the set of highly-valued past theories cited by Laudan, presumed 
to militate against realism, is in fact innocuous to the doctrine. The argument hinges 
largely on identifying the grounds on which theory-adoption is actually performed. 
1. A CHALLENGE TO REALISM 
Scientific realism associates the observational success of a theory to its 
truth. In its typical formulations, the doctrine maintains that a theory's 
having observational success to the highest possible degree is grounds 
for believing it to be true, and that a theory's having observational 
success to a somewhat lesser degree is grounds for believing it to be to 
a similar degree close to the truth. I take 'empirical adequacy', another 
expression which has occurred in the literature, to be synonymous with 
'observational success'. 
The requirement that a theory should possess a high degree of obser- 
vational success is very onerous. A theory has observational success to 
the highest possible degree just if all its claims are true of all observable 
phenomena, including phenomena in the past and phenomena in other 
ways inaccessible to us; a theory has such-and-such a degree of obser- 
vational success just if a corresponding proportion of its claims is true. 
This usage of 'observational success' is entrenched in the literature, 
among both antirealists and realists. (See respectively van Fraassen 
1980, p. 12, and Churchland 1985, pp. 38-39.) 
The debate over realism cannot be understood unless it is appreciated 
that it is high degrees of observational success, and not some lesser or 
other properties of theories, which realists claim are grounds for believ- 
ing a theory to be close to the truth. Clearly, the terms and outcome 
of the debate would be different if realists were positing an association 
between truth and some property of theories other than a high degree 
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of observational success. For instance, if realists claimed that grounds 
for considering a theory to be close to the truth were provided by the 
theory's being consistent with some small set of previously-known data, 
realism would be very implausible, in the light of the ease with which 
false premises can be constructed to entail true conclusions of limited 
scope. 
The degree of a theory's observational success is a property of it 
which depends only on the claims of the theory and the way the world 
is; in particular, it is independent of the degree of scientific attainment 
of those who embrace or consider the theory. A theory's degree of 
observational success does not vary with, for instance, the accumulation 
of evidence by a particular scientist or community. It is therefore strictly 
inappropriate to speak of a theory's 'having had' such-and-such a degree 
of observational success at a particular time, or of its 'having been' 
observationally very successful, if these phrases are meant to suggest 
that the theory might at a different time come to have some other 
degree of observational success. 
It roughly follows from the realists' claims that the policy of choosing 
theories in virtue of the degrees of their observational success results 
in the adoption of theories which are close to the truth; though perhaps 
this result is obtained only once a certain stage has been reached in the 
history of a science, so that the science can be presumed to have 
reached 'maturity', or to have 'latched on' correctly to the structure of 
the world. Physical science since the late Renaissance is cited as the 
paradigmatic 'mature science'. (Formulations of these realist tenets may 
be found in Putnam 1978, pp. 20-21; Hesse 1980, pp. 154-155; Newton- 
Smith 1981, pp. 39-43; Boyd 1984, pp. 41-42.) 
There is a class of historical instances which is purported to militate 
against scientific realism, or at least the version of the doctrine which 
I have reproduced above. Each of the episodes takes place in what was 
arguably a mature science, and has the following form: a theory to 
which the scientific community had acquired a commitment is dis- 
credited and succeeded by one containing theoretical terms radically 
different from those of its predecessor. Examples of these episodes are 
the substitution of theories appealing to phlogiston, caloric, or ether by 
later chemical, thermodynamic and electromagnetic theories. (Further 
historical examples are discussed in Laudan 1981, p. 33.) Let such 
episodes be called 'radical transitions'; and call the theories which 
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were abandoned and adopted in the course of a radical transition the 
transition's 'earlier' and 'later' theories respectively. 
Upon these episodes is based the following argument against scientific 
realism, first advanced by Laudan (1981, pp. 32-36, and 1984a, pp. 
120-124). Radical transitions have occurred in mature sciences. Today's 
realists typically believe the later theories of many radical transitions 
to be 'close to the truth'. But in every radical transition, the entities 
posited by the transition's earlier theory are very different from those 
pasited by the later theory: it would be inadmissible to believe in the 
existence of the entities of both theories. This means that realists must 
believe the transitions' earlier theories to be far from the truth, in any 
reasonable construal of 'proximity to the truth'. But the earlier as well 
as the later theory in each transition had demonstrated observational 
success to a considerable degree; indeed, the earlier theory as well as 
the later was chosen for adoption by the community on the strength of 
its possession of a high degree of observational success. It ensues that 
there are some theories in the mature sciences showing a high degree 
of observational success which realists, contrary to their own doctrine, 
are compelled to consider far from the truth. (It ensues similarly that 
the policy of choosing theories in virtue of their observational success 
has in the past resulted in the adoption of theories which the realist is 
compelled to consider far from the truth.) Therefore the observational 
success of theories cannot be associated with proximity to the truth in 
the way which realism envisages: we should do better to ,.abandon the 
realist construal of theories, and consider the unobservabie entities to 
which theories appeal as no more than useful fictions. 
This argument has been acknowledged as a substantial challenge to 
scientific realism by several realists, among whom are Brown (1985, 
pp. 54-55), Miller (1987, pp. 399-400), and Newton-Smith (1990, p. 
188). So far, most realists who have attempted to answer it have fol- 
lowed a particular strategy: they have accepted that the earlier theory 
in many radical transitions has a high degree of observational success, 
but denied that the realist is compelled to consider it far from the truth. 
For instance, Hardin and Rosenberg (1982) suggest that theories can 
be said to be approximately true even if their central terms do not refer; 
McMullin (1984, pp. 17-18) portrays the belief which was abandoned in 
typical radical transitions as not a proper scientific theory, but merely 
an intuitive assumption about the reality underlying phenomena, and 
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thus not a doctrine of the sort which the realist is committed to seeing 
as true or false; Cummiskey (1992, pp. 33-37) appeals to a metaphor- 
theory of reference to explain why the theoretical terms of a theory 
can fail to refer without the theory's being far from the truth. The 
strategy underlying these answers carries its own cost for realism, water- 
ing down the notion of proximity to the truth. 
In this paper, I offer an answer to Laudan's argument which follows 
a strategy different from the above. I accept that the realist is committed 
to the claim that a theory's having a high degree of observational 
success is grounds for considering it close to the truth; and I accept 
that the earlier theories in the radical transitions cited by Laudan cannot 
plausibly be considered close to the truth. But I deny that the earlier 
theory in each of the radical transitions cited by Laudan has a high 
degree of observational success, however highly it was valued by its 
own proponents. I draw attention first to the nature of the criteria 
actually used in theory-appraisal in the history of science. 
2. D I S C O V E R I N G  T H E  P R O P E l ( T I E S  O F  T H E  P R O P E R T I E S  O F  
T H E O R I E S  
To ascertain what criteria have actually been employed by scientists in 
selecting the theories which were to be legitimated as 'successful' is 
obviously relevant to a discussion of radical transitions. In that dis- 
cussion, after all, the realist is called to explain how certain theories, 
preserved in the historical record as 'successful', can be (as the realist 
would put it) distant from the truth. 
Philosophers who debate the plausibility of realism - realists as well 
as antirealists - frequently assume without second thought that theories 
which were in history counted as successful were judged to be so on 
the criteria reconstructed and prescribed by today's philosophers of 
science. In particular, since most of the participants to the current 
debate concur in considering degree of observational success to be one 
of the most notable properties of a theory, they tend to assume that 
scientists have judged theories - and judged certain theories to be 
successful - by checking their degrees of observational success. 
Laudan himself seems to assume this, in presenting his challenge to 
realism. He writes for instance that "what the history of science offers 
us is a plethora of theories which were both successful and [ . . .  ] non- 
referential" (1981, p. 33). He clearly means to suggest that these theo- 
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ries have been shown to possess a high degree of observational success: 
it is only under this assumption that realism can be confronted, as he 
intends it to be, with the challenge of explaining how theories which 
are observationally very successful can be far from the truth. 
Drawing inspiration from Laudan, many subsequent authors have 
attributed high degrees of observational success to theories which fail 
to refer, heightening the seeming hopelessness of the realists' position. 
For instance, Thagard (1988, p. 149) writes: "Laudan [ . . .  ] shows that 
it is problematic to explain the success of particular theories by the 
assumption that they refer to the real world, for there have been 
successful theories, such as the wave theory of light with its luminiferous 
ether, that failed to refer." Thagard presumably supposes that, in its 
heyday, the luminiferous-ether theory was shown to possess a high 
degree of observational success: this is the only sort of 'success' which 
would make this theory a problem for realism, in view of the fact that 
this is the only sort of success to which statements of the realist doctrine 
allude. 
If doubt could be cast upon the belief that such non-referring theories 
adopted in history indeed possess high degrees of observational success, 
the antirealist challenge would lose its effectiveness. This is what I 
propose to do. I intend first to undermine the assumption that scientists 
have ever judged theories to be successful or unsuccessful by checking 
their degree of observational success. Once this is done, it will be seen 
that the fact that a theory is legitimated in the historical record as 
'successful' does not establish that it possesses a high degree of obser- 
vational success. I will thereafter seek to suggest that, on the best 
evidence available today, the degree of observational success of many 
past theories, such as the earlier theories of radical transitions, is low, 
not high. 
There are many ways in which the assumption that scientists judge 
theories by checking their degrees of observational success could be 
brought into question. An easy way would be by compiling an account 
of theory-appraisal which minimized the incidence of logical and empiri- 
cal concerns of scientists and emphasized the role of their extra-empiri- 
cal interests. (For a review of historical evidence that extra-empirical 
concerns operate in science, see e.g. Buchdahl 1970, pp. 204-206 0 
Suppose for instance that it could be plausibly argued that scientists 
saw as their goal the achievement of certain aesthetic or ethical ends, 
and therefore evaluated theories not for their empirical virtues but for 
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nothing other than their aesthetic properties or ethical implications. 
Then it would appear plausible to conclude that scientists made only 
minimal appeal in their theory-evaluations to theories' degrees of obser- 
vational success. 
However, the cost of this route to the scientific realist would be 
unacceptable: the realist is committed to the theses that science has 
cognitive goals and consequently that procedures of theory-evaluation 
in at least the mature sciences have, in some sense, a grip on phenom- 
ena. While I wish to cast doubt on the assumption that theory-appraisal 
is conducted by reference to degrees of observational success, my ulti- 
mate aim is to defend realism: I must therefore seek a way of casting 
doubt on the assumption which does less harm than this to realism. I 
now sketch a model of theory-evaluation which refers to two sets of 
properties: the possible properties of theories, and these properties' 
own properties. 
Theories have many possible properties. Among them (though not 
necessarily among the most interesting) are the property of being 
mathematical, the property of according with the data t~f a certain set, 
and the property of being susceptible of concise formulation, These 
properties of theories themselves have properties: for instance, it may 
be a property of one possible property of theories that different theories 
can possess it to different degrees, or that its presence in a theory is 
difficult to ascertain, or that it reveals itself in a theory only once the 
theory has been applied in the design of experiments. 
Norms of theory-evaluation attach value to some properties of theo- 
ries. They are prescriptions of the form: "Ceteris paribus, value a theory 
more highly if it possesses property P." Whether value ought to be, or 
can usefully be, attached by the norms of theory-evaluation to a parti- 
cular property P depends on (among other things) the properties of P. 
Among the properties of P which carry the most weight in determining 
whether value should be attached to it by the norms of theory-evalu- 
ation are two: its logical relation with the goals attributed to science, 
and the ease with which its presence might be ascertained in theories. 
The properties which can most usefully be given value by the norms of 
theory-evaluation are those which are functionally related to the goals 
attributed to science, and are easily detected in theories. 
Let us apply this analysis to a particular possible property of theories, 
observational success. In science, one often hears, theories are to be 
valued in accordance with their possession of observational success. 
S C I E N T I F I C  R E A L I S M  209 
(Realists and antirealists would differ in their interpretation of this 
maxim, since the former see the observational success of a theory as a 
by-product of its truth while the latter see the aim of science as obser- 
vational success tout court; even so, both schools would be able to 
endorse this principle.) I agree that the property of observational suc- 
cess is what makes some theories valuable, and some theories preferable 
to others. But I deny that it is possible to choose among theories by 
checking a ttieory's possession of the property of observational success. 
My reasons refer to some properties of the property of observational 
success. 
The property of observational success is such that a theory would be 
revealed to demonstrate the highest degree possible of observational 
success just if it were seen to accord with all data accumulated from all 
sources over unlimited time-spans; it would be revealed to demonstrate 
such-and-such a degree of observational success presumably only by 
being seen to accord with a corresponding proportion of such data. 
Checking, or obtaining a direct reading or measure of the degree of a 
theory's observational success (henceforth to be called the theory's 
'OS measure'),  would therefore presumably involve ascertaining the 
proportion of such data with which the theory accords. 
It follows from this that it is not the case that the policy of evaluating 
and endorsing theories on the basis of OS measures has been pursued, 
or even could have been pursued, in the history of science. Even if the 
notion of counting and comparing the numbers of a theory's confirmed 
and disconfirmed predictions could be made precise, an OS measure 
could not be obtained in a finite time for generalizations of wide scope 
other than tautologies or contradictions. Scientists therefore cannot let 
theory-choices hang upon OS measures. (Another reason for doubting 
that our theory-appraisals are determined by OS measures is that, if 
they were, and if the OS measures were compiled correctly from the 
first, no new evidence could ever compel revisions of our past assess- 
ments of theories; and this suggestion seems contrary to our under- 
standing of empirical science.) 
Rather,  scientists conduct theory-evaluation by the use of criteria 
able to indicate in a finite and, whenever possible, short time which 
theory among several available should be embraced or pursued. These 
criteria of course cite some of the possible properties of theories: but 
not, at least directly, their property of observational success. 
The policy available to scientists which most closely approximates to 
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the policy of evaluating theories on the basis of OS measures is that of 
judging theories for properties which are diagnostic of high OS mea- 
sures. A property of a theory is diagnostic of high OS measures just if 
its possession by a theory indicates that the theory's OS measure is 
likely to be high. To the extent to which any property is diagnostic of 
high OS measures, a theory which exhibits it can legitimately be valued 
on the grounds that it is likely to possess a high OS measure. 
Some properties of theories are more strongly diagnostic of high OS 
measures than others are: that is, there will be a stronger correlation 
between high OS measures and the possession of some properties than 
between high OS measures and the possession of others. Scientists who 
value the observational success of theories should, of course, strive to 
identify properties of theories as strongly diagnostic of high OS mea- 
sures as possible, for use in their criteria of theory-evaluation. 
The strength with which criteria formulated by scientists are diagnos- 
tic of high OS measures depends on the scientists' awareness and under- 
standing of the properties of possible properties of theories. Particularly 
useful is an understanding of how each possible property of theories 
relates to empirical performance. A scientific community might identify 
some of the criteria most strongly diagnostic of high OS measures by 
considering what properties it seems minimally necessary or helpful for 
a theory to possess if it is to accord with large amounts of observational 
data. Among such properties might be consistency with known data, 
explanatory power, the ability to generate novel predictions, and as 
high as possible a degree of simplicity, as well as many properties of 
lesser scope peculiar to special sciences or topics. (One list of properties 
commonly held diagnostic of high OS measures is generated in Newton- 
Smith 1981, pp. 226-232.) 
However, any mistakes made in describ!ng the properties of the 
properties of theories will impair the effectiveness of scientists' evalu- 
ative criteria to diagnose high OS measures in theories. If a community 
believed that the property of, say, being consistent with atomism was 
necessary for a theory's truth, they would doubtless ensure that their 
criteria of theory-appraisal attached high value to it. If they were mis- 
taken in their understanding of the properties of the property 'consis- 
tency with atomism', and this property did not in fact promote good 
empirical performance in theories, their criteria of theory-appraisal 
would be somewhat less strongly diagnostic of high OS measures than 
they might otherwise have been. 
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Discovering the properties of the possible properties of theories is a 
task achieved by scientific communities only gradually, and by partly 
empirical methods, much like the task of discovering the properties of 
phenomena. Historians of science (e.g. Hesse 1980, pp. 14-15) often 
contrast late-twentieth-century beliefs about the properties of theories 
with the ideas prevalent in, say, the time of Copernicus, suggesting 
that there was then only rudimentary appreciation of what should be 
understood as a theory's empirical performance and what should count 
as a diagnostic indicator of this quality. Consistency with the Bible, 
with vitalism, with atomism, with common sense - these are possible 
properties of theories of which the properties have long been misunder- 
stood and about which discoveries have gradually been made. Some 
discoveries about the properties of theories are counted among the 
most notable events in the history of science. For instance, certain 
sixteenth-century astronomers elucidated important scepticist impli- 
cations of the property of 'consistency with bodies of known data', 
especially the fact that it can be found in theories which are false 
(Jardine 1987, pp. 90-92). The eighteenth-century mathematician 
Bayes, and others of his school, are credited with having discovered 
important properties of a theory's simplicity, especially its connection 
with the degrees of empirical support afforded to different theories by 
common bodies of data (Rosenkrantz 1976). In fact, much of the history 
of scientific method could be retold as a history of the gradual discovery 
of the properties of the possible properties of scientific theories. 
There is no reason to suppose that this gradual process of discovery 
has now ceased. Indeed, some important discoveries about the proper- 
ties of theories have occurred only very recently. For instance, the 
physics community has come to realize since the 1920s, with the advent 
of quantum mechanics, that one possible property of theories, the 
property of being deterministic, lacks a property which had previously 
been ascribed to it: the property that any theory which is close to the 
truth must necessarily possess it. 
Each successive discovery about the possible properties of theories 
has helped to improve the community's understanding of which proper- 
ties are strongly diagnostic of high OS measures, and which are not. 
Before each discovery of this kind, the best available criteria of theory- 
appraisal were somewhat less strongly diagnostic of high OS measures. 
Because of this, the judgements made in the remote past about the OS 
measures of theories are in general not as reliable as those which take 
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account of later discoveries about the properties of theories. It is only 
natural for those judgements to have been revised as further discoveries 
about the properties of theories accumulated. 
Let  us now turn back to the evidence constituted by radical transi- 
tions. According to the antirealist, radical transitions militate against 
realism because they show that, among the theories in science which 
have demonstrated a high degree of observational success, there are 
some which realists could not sensibly maintain were anything like close 
to the truth. This argument is now vulnerable to the following response, 
hinging on a reinterpretation of the historical data. 
The only claims for which radical transitions can provide evidence 
are claims about some theories deemed successful in the history of 
science. Now, radical transitions took place within the sequence of 
discoveries of properties of the properties of theories, and before some 
such discoveries were made. Therefore,  the theories deemed successful 
in the history of science were deemed to be so on the basis only of a 
set of criteria constructed in the ligh t of imperfect knowledge about the 
properties of the properties of theories. These criteria are not direct 
checks of OS measures: they are only diagnostic of high OS measures. 
Moreover,  some of them are only weakly diagnostic of high OS mea- 
sures, so much so that they have since been repudiated by the scientific 
community as appropriate grounds for theory-evaluation. 
But this means that Laudan's  argument falls short of demonstrating 
that the earlier theories of radical transitions have high OS measures. 
It has therefore failed to show that scientific realism is untenable. The 
most ambitious claim that appeal to a particular radical transition can 
establish is that, among the theories to have received high scores on a 
set of criteria of theory-evaluation of the sort discussed above, there 
are some which realists would not be able to maintain were close to 
the truth. It is consistent with this claim to assert, as realism does, that 
a theory possessing the highest possible OS measure is true, or that 
theories possessing high OS measures are close to the truth, or even 
that a policy of choosing theories in virtue of their OS measures would 
result in the adoption of theories increasingly close to the truth. 
The previous paragraph contains a minimal rebuttal of Laudan's 
argument: it points out that his case remains unproven,  since we cannot 
know that the earlier theories of radical transitions have high OS mea- 
sures, as his argument would require. But the resources of this approach 
enable us to go further, and achieve a more positive rebuttal. This 
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further response consists of showing that, on the best available evi- 
dence, we must expect the OS measures of the earlier theories of radical 
transitions to be low, not high. 
Since the earlier theory of the most recent radical transition was 
adopted, further discoveries have doubtless been made about the prop- 
erties of theories. These latest discoveries have enabled the scientific 
community further to refine their criteria of theory-choice. As a conse- 
quence, we now possess a set of evaluative criteria which we have good 
reason to believe is more strongly diagnostic of high OS measures than 
were the sets in use up to the time of the most recent radical transition. 
This latest set of criteria attributes to all the theories which were 'earlier 
theories' in radical transitions OS measures which are low, and much 
lower than those of the theories which succeeded them. (If this were 
not so, some of these discredited theories would constitute at least 
reasonably credible candidates for adoption today, while in fact they 
are not even remotely able to contend for adoption by the community 
- recall that we are speaking of such theories as the phlogiston and 
caloric theories.) This is our best available estimate of the OS measures 
of the theories abandoned in the course of radical transitions. There- 
fore, contrary to what Laudan suggests, radical transitions do not offer 
examples of theories which, while they cannot be considered close to 
the truth, have high OS measures: these theories have instead, to the 
best of our knowledge, low OS measures. 
I believe that the realists' case can be reinforced further, by elucidat- 
ing the nature of the historical variability of canons of theory-appraisal 
(section 4) and identifying radical transitions with revisions in these 
canons (section 5). First, however, we should consider what the antire- 
alist might be tempted to respond. 
3. S O M E  A N T I R E A L I S T  R E J O I N D E R S  A N D  T H E I R  S H O R T C O M I N G  
There are two immediate rejoinders to the argument of the previous 
section, by which the antirealist might attempt to show that radical 
transitions after all weigh against the plausibility of realism. I believe 
that each of them fails. 
1. Antirealists might maintain the following: scientific realists have 
acquired a commitment to the claim that, if a theory scored high on 
some actual past criteria of theory-appraisal (not only "if it had a high 
OS measure"), it is close to the truth. Then radical transitions indeed 
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militate against realism, since it is generally acknowledged by realists 
that the earlier theory in each transition, while highly-valued on evalu- 
ative criteria in force at its time, is not close to the truth. 
The best realist response to this claim is flatly to deny its premise: 
realists have not (and certainly ought not to have) committed them- 
selves to the claim that a theory which scored high on any old evaluative 
canon is close to the truth. In fact, this claim is of such extreme 
relativism that it is difficult to imagine its being seriously entertained 
by a realist: it amounts to claiming that a theory is close to the truth 
if at some point in history it was highly valued for being entrenched in 
Aristotelian scholasticism, or for according with a literalist reading of 
the bible, or for being supported by animism. All that the realist 
typically claims (or ought to claim) is some version of the tenet that 
theories with high OS measures are close to the truth. 
2. The antirealist might maintain that the realist has acquired a 
commitment to the claim that those theories are close to the truth 
which have demonstrated to high degree a pragmatic 'manipulative 
efficacy' (an attainment different from observational success) in the 
surroundings of their adherents: Laudan (1984b, p. 89) develops a 
notion of this kind. Radical transitions might then prove hostile to 
realism, if they were found to offer examples of theories which, while 
manipulatively very efficacious, could not reasonably be considered 
close to the truth. 
The evident realist response is, again, that realists generally confine 
their claims to versions of the view that only those theories are close 
to the truth which have a high degree of observational success. To this 
may usefully be added the claim that, in so far as manipulative efficacy 
differs from observational success, there is an only loose correlation 
between a theory's proximity to the truth and its efficacy; in view of 
this, it is not surprising if some manipulatively efficacious theories are 
far from the truth. 
Another possible response to this second antirealist rejoinder is the 
following. Laudan acknowledges (1984b, pp. 88-89) that 'manipulative 
efficacy' is a measure of success set out by the present-day philosopher, 
not a criterion of appraisal consistently employed throughout the history 
of science. This being so, the historical record cannot be presumed 
without further investigation to consist of a sequence of theories which 
were manipulatively very efficacious in the environment of their adher- 
ents. Such further investigation might be carried out in two ways: by 
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measuring the efficacy of a theory either in the environment in which 
it was formulated and adopted, or in the environment of the present 
day. It is, for historiographic reasons (explored in e.g. Hesse 1980, pp. 
23-25), difficult for us to establish the degree to which a theory was 
manipulatively efficacious in a past environment. That leaves the possi- 
bility of testing whether the earlier theory of some radical transition, 
such as the phlogiston theory, is manipulatively highly efficacious in 
the present-day environment. It would, I think, be plausible for realists 
to forecast that such theories would be judged manipulatively not very 
efficacious in our surroundings, especially if this test took the form 
(as do most practical theory-evaluations) of a comparison against an 
alternative theory, being the competing theory held to at the present 
day. If this judgement is borne out, the second possible antirealist 
rejoinder fares no better than the first. 
4. T R U T H  I N  T H E  L I M I T  O F  T H E O R Y - C H O I C E  
The argument has now reached the following state. It is admittedly 
implausible to assert of certain highly-valued theories in the history of 
science that they are close to the truth. From this, antirealists sought 
to conclude that realism has failed to establish an association between 
observational success and truth. Realists can now reply, however, that 
what ought throughout to have been claimed on behalf of the theories 
cited was not that they possessed high OS measures, but merely that 
they were deserving of adoption on the particular set of criteria of 
theory-appraisal being employed at the time of their formulation. 
The question then arises: if, as I have argued, the policy of choosing 
theories in virtue of their OS measures is never actually applied in the 
history of science, what relation has the doctrine of realism to actual 
science? Scientific realism could be thought to reduce to the counterfac- 
tual claim that, if theory-choice were conducted on OS measures, the 
theories thereby adopted would approximate closely to the truth. But 
a more historicist answer will be preferred. 
I claimed in section 2 that science's canons of theory-appraisal have 
shown considerable historical variability. Some of these changes were 
made by communities in the light of discoveries about the properties 
of the properties of theories. These discoveries led the community to 
compile a list of evaluative criteria which there is reason to believe was 
more strongly diagnostic of high OS measures in theories than was their 
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previous list. (For discussions of the procedures by which empirical 
evaluative criteria can be appraised without circularity in the light of 
theories' empirical performance, see Rescher 1977, pp. 66-80, Newton- 
Smith 1981, pp. 224-225, and Laudan 1984a, pp. 42-66.) 
Successive changes of this kind in a community's set of evaluative 
criteria can be interpreted as improvements of the fit between the 
sequence of theory-choices actually made by the community and the 
pattern of theory-choices as they might hypothetically be made on OS 
measures. In turn, the policy of choosing theories on OS measures can 
be described as the ideal limit of the series constituted by the policies 
of choosing theories on the basis of the community's successive actual 
sets of criteria of theory-evaluation. 
This latter formulation offers a way to anchor the doctrine of realism 
to the progress of the actual history of science, while maintaining its 
links with the concept of high OS measures. I propose that scientific 
realism should be construed as making, in effect, the following claim: 
the policy of choosing theories for adoption, on the basis of a set of 
criteria which lies at the limit of the process of revision of the scientific 
community's set of criteria of theory-assessment, results in the adoption 
of theories close to the truth. 
There are two comments on this formulation. First, by locating the 
object of their claims in the future, it has the advantage of absolving 
realists from having to profess belief in the proximity to the truth of 
every theory highly valued in past or current science. Secondly, it offers 
a new variant of the idea of 'convergent realism': while this doctrine 
has so far been interpreted most commonly as the theory-level claim 
that scientific theories are converging upon the truth, the present formu- 
lation advances the meta-level or methodology-level claim that actual 
criteria of theory-appraisal are converging on a limit constituted by the 
criterion of OS measures. (The notion of a limit of convergence at the 
level of theories is further explored, from a pragmatist perspective, by 
Jardine 1986.) 
Those who believe that realism is akin to an empirical hypothesis 
(like Putnam 1978, pp. 78-79; for criticism see Laudan 1981, pp. 45-46) 
will ask whether this revised formulation of the doctrine is susceptible to 
test by appeal to the history of science. Perhaps it is. According to the 
realist, theories which possessed the highest OS measures possible 
would be true, since their claims would be true of all observable phe- 
nomena. If several theories each had the highest OS measures possible, 
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and therefore were all true, they would be all consistent with one 
another. Therefore,  if there were assured a supply of theories which 
were good enough, theory-choice on the basis of OS measures would 
lead to the adoption of theories which would be consistent with one 
another. It might be presumed that theory-choice on the basis of a set 
of criteria which approximates more and more closely to the criterion 
of OS measures would lead to the adoption of theories which exhibited 
a greater and greater degree of consistency with one another. Call the 
property of a number of theories of exhibiting a certain degree of 
consistency with one another their 'logical bunching'. Then a period of 
history of science, in which successive revisions were applied to the 
set of criteria of theory-choice to improve their approximation to OS 
measures, ought, if the doctrine of realism in this revised formulation 
is tenable, to exhibit an increased logical bunching of theories. The 
plausibility of scientific realism could therefore be investigated by com- 
paring the degrees of logical bunching of theories in a science chosen 
under successive sets of evaluative criteria. 
5 .  A R E A L I S T  A C C O U N T  OF R A D I C A L  T R A N S I T I O N S  
If formulated as above, the doctrine of scientific realism does not just 
accommodate the occurrence of radical transitions: it offers an account 
of them too. The account depicts radical transitions as coinciding with 
revisions of communities'  criteria of theory-appraisal, of the sort de- 
scribed in the previous section. 
Each radical transition, I claim, can be interpreted as an occasion in 
which the set of criteria of theory-assessment deemed by the community 
to be diagnostic of observational success underwent a change possessing 
two characteristics. The two characteristics are: the change was suffi- 
cient to compel or strongly encourage the abandonment of the theory 
which was, as a matter  of fact, abandoned in the historical instance; 
and it left the community with a set of criteria which compelled or 
strongly encouraged the adoption of the theory which was, as a matter  
of fact, adopted as a result of the transition. (The reason for stipulating 
these characteristics is to prevent radical transitions from being linked 
with only cosmetic changes of evaluative criteria.) On this interpreta- 
tion, a theory abandoned in a radical transition is abandoned on the 
grounds of its having fallen foul of some evaluative criterion newly 
(or simultaneously) introduced into the community's evaluative set; 
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correspondingly, the theory embraced in a radical transition is one to 
which the new set of criteria led, or of which it permitted the adoption. 
(This suggestion is reminiscent of the idea of Kuhn 1962, pp. 109- 
110, that a paradigm comes into the world equipped with criteria of 
assessment on which its theories will achieve scores that are high, and 
higher than those of their predecessors.) 
These changes of evaluative criteria should be imagined not as occur- 
ring gratuitously, but rather as being prompted by new discoveries 
about the possible properties of theories, as described in section 2. 
The revisions of the community's evaluative canon are signs of the 
community's wish to take the fullest account in its theory-choices of its 
improved understanding of the properties of the properties of theories. 
There is an easy defence for the claim that every radical transition 
can be interpreted as a case in which the community's set of criteria 
for theory-choice underwent a change possessing the two characteristics 
cited. A radical transition is defined as an episode in which one theory 
is succeeded by another containing radically different theoretical terms. 
If the terms of the later theory are so different from those of its 
predecessor, the theoretical terms of the later theory will possess some 
characteristics not possessed by the theoretical terms of the earlier 
theory, and vice versa.  The abandonment of the earlier theory and the 
adoption of the later one can be compelled or strongly encouraged by 
criteria of theory-choice which refer appositely to these disjoint sets of 
features. In general, therefore, the possibility of associating any radical 
transition with a change of evaluative canon of this kind is not in doubt. 
For instance, the transition from the phlogiston to the oxygen theory 
can be interpreted as a case in which the scientific community changed 
its mind about the sorts of theories which could legitimately be proposed 
to solve empirical problems, or in which it revised the portfolio of 
criteria which it deemed to be diagnostic of high OS measures. The 
community may be interpreted as having come to hold to, say, the 
criterion that a chemical theory ought not to invoke substances (or, as 
the antirealist would put it, theoretical terms which might be construed 
as a description of substances) which possessed the properties of impal- 
pability or negative weight. The phlogiston theory did not, and the 
oxygen theory did, satisfy this criterion for theory-choice: this is why 
- the realist reading continues - the oxygen theory was preferred to 
the phlogiston theory from a certain date onwards. 
While the previous paragraph was meant only to convey the sort of 
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construction which the realist would seek to place upon a radical transi- 
tion, recent historiography of the chemical revolution (see Donovan 
1988, pp. 228-231) has in fact drawn attention to the influence which 
changes in criteria of theory-appraisal exerted upon changes in substan- 
tive theory. A suggestion which has gathered particular support is that 
Lavoisier should be seen as having imported into chemistry standards 
of appraisal characteristic of mathematical physics, and that these were 
in part responsible for dissatisfaction with phlogiston theory (Melhado 
1985, pp. 209-211; Donovan 1988, pp. 220-222). Rather than its being 
the case that "after discovering oxygen Lavoisier worked in a different 
world", as Kuhn (1962, p. 118) anti-realistically puts it, Lavoisier and 
his community embraced the oxygen theory because their world had 
already changed in one particular respect: in the respect of coming to 
contain a set of criteria for theory-choice in chemistry different from 
the one upon which the phlogiston theory had previously been valued. 
Similarly, the disappearance of the caloric from theories of heat in 
the 1810s can be retraced in part to changes in methodological canons, 
as a result of which scepticism arose about the imponderable fluids 
traditionally postulated in Laplacian physics. (On this interpretation of 
the fall of the caloric theory, see Fox 1990, pp. 287-289.) 
If this interpretation of radical transitions is justified, these instances 
ought to be thought of less as prompted by discoveries about the 
properties of phenomena, and more as prompted by discoveries about 
the possible properties of theories. Radical transitions, as opposed to 
more mundane cases of theory-succession, might signal to the historian 
of science times at which a new discovery or understanding about the 
properties of the properties of theories was first applied in theory- 
appraisal. 
6. T H E  R E A L I S T ' S  A N S W E R  
Realists have acquired a new response to antirealists. The latter had 
asked them, "How do you explain the failure to refer of the theoretical 
terms of theories such as the phlogiston theory, if a) you believe that 
observational success is linked to truth in the way you require, and b) 
you admit that the phlogiston theory was successful?" The antirealists' 
arguments have aimed to force realists to the admission, "The notion 
that theoretical terms should be interpreted as referring is incoherent." 
The realist is by contrast now in a position to answer as follows: "The 
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phlogiston theory demonstrated to the eighteenth-century community 
its empirical value upon being judged on such-and-such a set of criteria. 
This set of criteria was then deemed diagnostic of high OS measures, 
but is different both from our present set of criteria of theory-appraisal, 
and (even more emphatically) from a criterion of directly consulting 
theories' OS measures. Therefore, the phlogiston theory never demon- 
strated to the eighteenth-century community that it possessed a high 
OS measure. Part of the reason why we have since come to realize that 
the central term of the phlogiston theory fails to refer, and therefore 
that the theory is far from the truth, is that we now evaluate theories 
on this such-and-such other set of criteria of theory-appraisal, the ver- 
dicts of which we deem to be a closer approximation to OS measures. 
This is also part of the reason why the present-day chemical community 
no longer holds to the phlogiston theory." 
On this interpretation, far from confuting scientific realism, case- 
studies of radical transitions can offer evidential support to the doctrine: 
they are capable of confirming that in radical transitions criteria of 
theory-choice undergo profound revision, and that therefore the theo- 
ries embraced at the eve of a transition were chosen for adoption on 
criteria different from those applied upon its completion, and certainly 
different from OS measures. Such findings would substantiate one of 
the theses defended here: that the reason why certain highly-valued 
past theories can be so obviously far from the truth is not that scientific 
realism is incoherent, but that theories are in fact valued on grounds 
other than their possession of high OS measures. 
I offer this paper as a response to a particular criticism of scientific 
realism, rather than as an overall vindication of the doctrine. Clearly, 
there may still be grounds on which to doubt the plausibility of realism; 
but I believe that arguments based on the evidence from radical transi- 
tions, which I reconstructed in section 1, are not among them. 
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